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SIXTH AMENDMENT-PRECLUSION OF
DEFENSE WITNESSES AND THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT'S COMPULSORY
PROCESS CLAUSE RIGHT TO
PRESENT A DEFENSE
Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Taylor v. Illinois,1 a majority of the United States Supreme
Court determined that the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment 2 was not violated by the preclusion of a witness's testi-
mony as a sanction for the violation of discovery rules.3 The Court
affirmed an Illinois Appellate Court decision 4 that upheld the trial
court's exclusion of the testimony.5 In reaching this conclusion the
Court ostensibly declined to establish a set standard for when dis-
covery violations warranted such an extreme sanction, instead pro-
moting a balancing of the interests involved. 6 These interests
include the defendant's right to present testimony as guaranteed by
the compulsory process clause and the state's interest in orderly,
fair, and accurate criminal trials. 7
In deciding Taylor, however, the Court failed to actually apply
such a balancing test. Instead, it established a standard for the dis-
cretionary use of preclusion when a willful violation of discovery
rules exists. 8 This Note reviews the Taylor opinion and concludes
that the Court failed to properly define or consider all the important
factors to be balanced. Additionally, the Court's willful violation
1 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).
2 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This sixth
amendment right is applicable in state and federal prosecutions. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
3 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 656.
4 State v. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d 839, 491 N.E.2d 3 (1st Dist. 1986).
5 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 657.
6 Id. at 655.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 656.
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standard can act to improperly deprive a defendant of his right to
present testimony. This Note further suggests a more detailed bal-
ancing test that would better protect the defendant's right to pres-
ent testimony.
II. FACTS
Ray Taylor was convicted by a jury for the attempted murder of
Jack Bridges during a street fight that occurred on August 6, 1981. 9
The incident took place on the south side of Chicago and was wit-
nessed by twenty or thirty bystanders.' 0 The prosecution presented
testimony from four witnesses, including the victim Bridges, that a
twenty minute argument had occurred between Bridges and a man
named Derrick Travis over an hour before the violent confronta-
tion."I The violent confrontation involved Travis and several of his
friends, including the defendant Taylor, against Bridges and his
brother.' 2 It was undisputed that at least three members of Taylor's
group carried pipes and clubs that were used to beat Bridges. 3
The prosecution's witnesses also testifed that as Bridges at-
tempted to flee, Taylor shot him once in the back and then unsuc-
cessfully attempted, due to the weapon misfiring, to shoot him in
the head. 14 The only two witnesses called for the defense, two sis-
ters who were friends of Taylor, testified that Bridges' brother, and
not Taylor, was the one carrying the gun and that he had shot into
the group and accidentally struck his brother.
15
Prior to the trial, Taylor's lawyer responded to a discovery mo-
tion that had requested a list of witnesses by identifying the two sis-
ters, as well as two other men who subsequently did not testify.
16
Defense counsel was allowed to amend that answer on the first day
of trial, and added two more names, Derrick Travis and a member of
the Chicago Police Department, both of whom were not subse-
quently called to testify.' 7 Defense counsel made an oral motion to
amend the witness list again on the second day of the trial after two
of the prosecution's main witnesses had testified.' 8 The defense
claimed that it had just learned of two additional witnesses, Alfred
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Wormley and Pam Berkhalter. 19
As an explanation for the late production of the new names,
defense counsel told the court that the defendant had actually in-
formed him of these witneses earlier, but that the defendant could
not locate Wormley. 20 The court noted that counsel should have
supplied the names earlier even if the addresses were unknown and
also expressed concern as to whether the witnesses were actually
present during the incident.2' The judge then directed that the two
additional witnesses be brought into court the next day at which
time he would rule on the admissibility of their testimony.22 The
following day the judge discussed the ramifications of violating dis-
covery rules, but allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof
by presenting Wormley's testimony while the jury was removed.23
Wormley testified that he had not witnessed the confrontation
itself, but that he had seen Bridges and his brother carrying two
guns under a blanket and heard them say they were after Taylor and
his friends.24 Wormley further testified that he later saw Taylor's
group and warned them that the Bridges' group was armed. 25 Upon
cross-examination Wormley revealed that he had met Taylor about
four months prior to that day, approximately two years after the in-
cident, and that defense counsel had visited him at his home the
week before the trial began.26
Based upon Wormley's testimony, the trial judge decided that
the exclusion of his testimony was an appropriate sanction for the
discovery violation. 27 The judge stated that it was a willful and bla-
tant violation of the rules of discovery and that he doubted the ve-
racity of Wormley's testimony.28 Furthermore, the judge noted a
pattern of blatant discovery violations in the last three or four cases
in his courtroom and expressed his desire to put a stop to that pat-
tern.29 Taylor was subsequently convicted and that conviction was
affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court.30
19 Id.
20 Id. The record has no further mention of Berkhalter.







28 Id. At the trial court level, the only objection to the preclusion of Wormley's testi-
mony came in Taylor's "motion for new trial, stating '[t]he Court erred by not letting a
witness for defendant testify before the jury.'" Id. at 658 (quoting Record at 412).
29 Id. at 650.
3o State v. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d 839, 844-845, 491 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1st Dist. 1986).
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The Appellate Court ruled that the severity of a sanction im-
posed against a party for the violation of a rule of discovery was
within the discretion of the trial court and that the preclusion of
Wormley's testimony was within that discretion. 3' The Illinois
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.32 The United States
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider whether the pre-
clusion of a defense witness as a sanction for the infraction of a pre-
trial discovery rule violated the defendant's sixth amendment right
to compulsory process. 33
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion affirming Taylor's
conviction by a five-to-three vote. 34 Justice Stevens first determined
that a discovery sanction that precludes a defense witness from testi-
fying may violate the defendant's sixth amendment compulsory pro-
cess clause rights, which confers on the accused the right to
subpoena witnesses and the right to present witnesses in his own
defense.35 The Court held that this sixth amendment right to pres-
ent witnesses, however, is not absolute and the discovery sanction of
preclusion is justified when a discovery violation is willful and moti-
vated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage or to conceal a plan
to present fabricated testimony.3 6
Justice Stevens began his analysis by examining the nature of
the right to present witnesses and the role of the compulsory pro-
cess clause in protecting that right.37 He reasoned that the compul-
sory process clause's "right to compel a witness' presence in the
courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if
it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard. '38
The Court noted that the State's contention that the compulsory
31 Id. The Appellate Court noted that the only witness preclusion issue before it was
whether "the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of a defense
witness as a sanction for violation of the discovery rules." Id. at 839, 491 N.E.2d at 4-5.
The Appellate Court did not, however address either the compulsory process claim im-
plied in the briefs, or the due process claim expressly asserted in the briefs concerning
witness preclusion.
32 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 648.
33 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987).
34 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 648. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia.
35 Id. at 652-53.
36 Id. at 655-56.
37 Id. at 651-53.
38 Id. at 652.
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process clause had no role in supporting this right or in determining
the constitutionality of the infringement of this right by a discovery
sanction was "supported by the plain language of the [compulsory
process] Clause,39 ... by the historical evidence that it was intended
to provide defendants with subpoena power that they lacked at com-
mon law,40 by some scholarly comment, 41 and by a brief excerpt
from the legislative history of the Clause." 42 Justice Stevens then
noted, however, that the Court had consistently interpreted the
compulsory process clause in a broader manner more in line with
state constitutional provisions which legislatures had drafted during
the same time period and gave the defendant the right to present
evidence advantageous to his defense.
43
Justice Stevens stated that " '[o]ur cases establish, at a mini-
mum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's
assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at
trial and the right to put before ajury evidence that might influence
the determination of guilt.' "44 Justice Stevens characterized previ-
ous Supreme Court cases as establishing that "[flew rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present his own defense"
45
and that such a right "is an essential attribute of the adversary sys-
tem itself."46 Because of this important role, Justice Stevens rea-
soned that the right to "compel a witness' presence in the
courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if
it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by
the trier of fact," 47 and therefore the right to offer testimony can be
implicitly found in the sixth amendment.
48
39 See supra note 2.
40 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 651. In support, the Court cited Clinton, The Right to Present a
Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee In Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 767
(1976).
41 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 651. (Court cited 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 68-70 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)(compulsory process clause does not support a defendant's
right to present a defense)).
42 Id. at 651-652 n.12. The Congress defeated a proposed amendment to the com-
pulsory process clause that would have allowed the defendent a continuance when he
could show that a witness who was material to his defense and for whom process had
been granted had not been served. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 756 (1789).
43 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 652.
44 Id. at 652 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987)(criminal de-
fendant's conviction reversed and remanded because he was not allowed to examine
government documents that may have affected the outcome of the trial)).
45 Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
46 Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)(President's duty to disclose
tapes of personal conversations with defendants based in part on defendants' compul-
sory process clause rights)).
47 Id.
48 Id. Justice Stevens also quoted from Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), in
1988] 839
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The Court next addressed Taylor's contention that the compul-
sory process clause created an absolute bar to the preclusion of de-
fense evidence as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule and
concluded that it was "just as extreme and just as unacceptable as
the State's position that the Amendment is simply irrelevant. The
accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is
incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard
rules of evidence."
49
In reaching that conclusion, the Court differentiated several
rights protected by the sixth amendment. 50 Justice Stevens first
noted that while the privileges of most sixth amendment rights were
automatically bestowed on a defendant in order to protect him from
prosecutorial abuses, the "right to compel the presence and present
the testimony of witnesses .... may be employed to rebut the prose-
cution's case. The decision whether to employ it in a particular case
rests solely with the defendant." 51
Justice Stevens further explained that the principle underlying
the right to present evidence was also the source of necessary limita-
tions on that right.52 He stressed that "[t]he adversary process
could not function effectively without adherence to rules of proce-
dure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to
provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit
evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case." 53 Further-
more, Justice Stevens continued, absolute control of the presenta-
tion of witnesses' testimony by either party would seriously
undermine the entire trial process. 54 Toward that end, he said, the
State is justified in imposing and enforcing rules of evidence that
control the identification and presentation of witnesses. 55
The Court determined that the defendant's right to compulsory
process was intended to "vindicate the principle that the 'ends of
criminal justice would be defeated ifjudgments were to be founded
which it was determined that the right to present a defense consisted of the right to
compel the attendance of witnesses and offer their testimony and that such a right
"'stands on no lesser footing than other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previ-
ously held applicable to the states.'" Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 652-653 (quoting Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)).
49 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 653.




54 Id. Justice Stevens discussed the act of interrupting the opposing party's case or
the jury's deliberation to present newly discovered evidence as examples of unaccept-
ably disruptive actions. Id.
55 Id.
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on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.' ",56 Procedural
rules, including pretrial discovery and cross-examination, further
minimize "the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incom-
plete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony."
'57
In support of the importance of the State's interest in a full dis-
closure of the facts, Justice Stevens noted Brown v. United States,58 in
which the Court held that "even the defendant may not testify with-
out being subjected to cross-examination." 59 The Court also ac-
knowledged United States v. Nobles60 as supporting this state interest
by upholding the exclusion of an expert witness because the defend-
ant did not permit discovery of the expert's written report.61 The
Court emphasized its language in Nobles that "'[t]he Sixth Amend-
ment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the
Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have
been a half-truth.' "62
Taylor had argued that preclusion was too drastic a sanction to
ever be imposed for failure to include a witness on a pretrial list,
because other less drastic sanctions are available for violations of
pretrial discovery rules. 63 Such sanctions could be imposed against
either the defendant or defense counsel, and prejudice to the prose-
cution could be limited by allowing a continuance or mistrial to al-
low further time for investigation of the proposed witness.
64
Justice Stevens responded to this argument by noting that while
alternative sanctions may be adequate in most cases, they would,
56 Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)).
57 Id. at 654. The Court also discussed the dangers to the state of an eleventh hour
defense given the ease with which an alibi can be manufactured and the longstanding
existence of notice-of-alibi rules in a large number of states to help reduce such sur-
prises at trials. Id. at 653-654 nn.16-17 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82
(1970)).
58 356 U.S. 148 (1958)(defendant waived her fifth amendment right to not answer
questions on cross-examination when she testified at her own denaturalization
proceedings).
59 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Brown, 356 U.S. at 156).
60 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
61 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 654 (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241).
62 Id. at 654 (quoting Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241 (emphasis omitted)). The Court in
Nobles precluded the expert's testimony as a "method of assuring compliance" with its
discovery order. The district court in that case "did not bar the investigator's testimony
.... It merely prevented [the defendant] from presenting to the jury a partial view of
the credibility issue by adducing the investigator's testimony and thereafter refusing to
disclose the contemporaneous report that might offer further critical insights." Nobles,
422 U.S. at 241.
63 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 654. For a discussion of such alternatives, see infra notes 227-
243 and accompanying text.
64 Id. at 654-655.
1988]
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nonetheless, be less effective than preclusion and there would be
instances in which these alternative sanctions would fail to properly
protect the state interest protected by discovery rules.65 Justice Ste-
vens described one such instance to be the attempted use of
fabricated testimony through a series of discovery rule violations. 66
In such a case, he said, "[i]f a pattern of discovery violations is expli-
cable only on the assumption that the violations were designed to
conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony, it would be entirely
appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence regardless of whether
other sanctions would also be merited. 67
In declining to establish a comprehensive set of standards to
control the proper use of discretion in such cases, the Court empha-
sized the defendant's basic right to present testimony.68 However,
the Court continued, "mere invocation of that right cannot auto-
matically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests." 69
The countervailing public interests considered by Justice Stevens
were the "integrity of the adversary process," " the interest in the
fair and efficient administration ofjustice," and "the potential prej-
udice to the truth-determining function of the trial process."70
Justice Stevens stated that when a trial judge learns that a fail-
ure to disclose all witnesses prior to trial "was willful and motivated
by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage . . . it would be entirely
consistent with the purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply to
exclude the witness' testimony. 71
In rejecting Taylor's assertion that preclusion is an inappropri-
ate sanction regardless of the severity of the discovery violation, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that "[i]t would demean the high purpose of
the Compulsory Process Clause to construe it as encompassing an
absolute right to an automatic continuance or mistrial to allow pre-






71 Id. at 655-656. The Court acknowledged that while there may be legitimate rea-
sons for not wishing to disclose a witness' name, such concerns should be raised prior to
trial. Additionally, the Court stated that there was no indication that Taylor had ob-
jected to the discovery request on any grounds. Id. at 656 n.20. The Court further noted
that the difficulty or "simplicity of compliance with the discovery rule [was] also rele-
vant." Id. at 656. Because the invocation of the compulsory process clause by the de-
fendant already requires planning and affirmative actions by the defendant and defense
counsel, including locating, interrogating, and serving subpoenas upon witnesses, iden-
tifying them in advance does not require much additional effort. Id.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 79
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sumptively perjured testimony to be presented to a jury. 72
In rejecting Taylor's argument that te preclusion of Worm-
ley's testimony was unnecessarily harsh, Justice Stevens looked past
any potential prejudice that might have occurred to the prosecution
if the court had permitted Wormley to testify. 73 Justice Stevens ex-
pressed a concern for "the impact of this kind of conduct on the
integrity of the judicial process itself."74 The Court agreed with the
trial judge that this was a case of willful misconduct, and that the
defense counsel had attempted to gain a tactical advantage through
violation of the discovery rules.75 The Court justified the preclusion
sanction both on the grounds that, generally, categories of inadmis-
sible evidence may properly be excluded by the rules of evidence
even though the particular testimony offered may not be prejudicial
and, specifically, that enough doubts were raised by the record to
question Wormley's veracity.76
The Court then addressed Taylor's argument that he should
not be punished for his attorney's mistakes because the preclusion
of favorable testimony was not actually a sanction against the lawyer
who violated the discovery rules, but only served to penalize Taylor
by hurting his chances for acquittal.77 The Court stated that a law-
yer must have full authority to speak for his client at trial in order to
preserve the adversarial system and that in such situations Taylor
must accept his attorney's decisions in managing the trial, with the
exception of cases in which counsel is ineffective. 78 Furthermore,
requiring a determination of the relative culpability of the lawyer
and the defendant prior to the sanction of preclusion would require
extensive investigation that would be "highly impracticable.
'" 79
72 Id. at 656.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. The Court placed emphasis on the fact that defense counsel had actually inter-
viewed Wormley one week prior to the trial, did not identify Wormley in the amended
Answer to Discovery on the first day of the trial, and identified but failed to place on the
stand two actual eyewitnesses. Id. The Court also noted that the trial court was con-
cerned about discovery violations in previous cases. Justice Stevens acknowledged that
this was an appropriate concern only if Taylor's attorney had been involved in these
previous violations. Otherwise, this was an improper consideration for justifying an in-
fringement upon Taylor's constitutional right to present a defense. Id.
76 Id. at 657. The Court noted that "[t]he pretrial conduct revealed by the record in
this case gives rise to a sufficiently strong inference 'that witnesses are being found that







B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion80 and ar-
gued that when there is no evidence of the defendant's involvement
in a discovery rule violation, "the Compulsory Process Clause per se
bars discovery sanctions that exclude criminal defense evidence." 8'
Justice Brennan thought that the question in this case was I"not
whether discovery rules should be enforced but whether the need to
correct and deter discovery violations requires a sanction that itself
distorts the truthseeking process by excluding material evidence of
innocence in a criminal case." 82
The dissent agreed with the majority opinion that Taylor's con-
stitutional claims were not waived in the Appellate Court of Illi-
nois. 83 Justice Brennan did not agree, however, that these claims
were properly preserved at trial and concluded that Taylor had
waived his constitutional rights as a matter of Illinois law.84
Justice Brennan noted that Taylor had only claimed at the trial
court level that the court erred in precluding Wormley's testi-
mony.8 5 Justice Brennan argued that the Appellate Court of Illinois,
in a previous case,86 had already held that the claim that the court
erred preserved only an abuse of discretion claim and waived any
constitutional claims.8 7 However, Justice Brennan continued, the
Illinois Appellate Court's determination that federal constitutional
claims were waived as a matter of Illinois state law does not mean
that they are waived as a matter of federal law.88
80 Id. at 657. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun in
dissent.
81 Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 657-658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with this conclusion based on
his opinion that Taylor's appellate brief properly presented the compulsory process
clause claim and the fact that the analysis regarding Taylor's claims "would essentially
be the same under the due process clause." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan later noted that both the compulsory process clause and the due process clause
"require courts to conduct a searching substantive inquiry whenever the government
seeks to exclude criminal defense evidence." Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
supra note 31 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Illinois Appellate
Court decision.
8.4 Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see supra note 28 for the objection that
Taylor raised at trial.
85 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 People v. Douthit, 51 Ill. App. 3d 751, 366 N.E.2d 950 (1977)(claim that court
erred in precluding defense witness testimony "raises only the nonconstitutional ques-
tion whether the trial court abused its discretion in exercising the exclusion").
87 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "it is well estab-
lished that where a state court possesses the power to disregard a procedural default in
exceptional cases, the state court's failure to exercise that power in a particular case does
844 [Vol. 79
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Justice Brennan then considered the merits of the case itself.
Starting from the premise that the compulsory process clause grants
the defendant a substantive right to present exculpatory evidence,
Justice Brennan stated his agreement with the part of the majority
opinion that rejected the State's argument that the compulsory pro-
cess clause only granted the power to subpoena witnesses.8 9 How-
ever, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority that the plain
language of the compulsory process clause supported the state's po-
sition.90 Justice Brennan argued that such an interpretation would
result in making the subpoena power meaningless if subpoenaed de-
fense witnesses were not allowed to testify. 9 1
Justice Brennan asserted that the compulsory process clause
and the due process clause require the courts to conduct a substan-
tive inquiry whenever an attempt is made to exclude defense evi-
dence,9 2 because the exclusion of such evidence "undermines the
central truthseeking aim of our criminal justice system because it
deliberately distorts the record at the risk of misleading the jury into
convicting an innocent person."9 3 Justice Brennan recognized,
however, that there still existed valid restrictions on the presenta-
tion of evidence that are not made unconstitutional under the com-
pulsory process clause.
9 4
Justice Brennan reviewed the Court's prior analysis in cases in
which the government sought to exclude criminal defense evi-
dence9 5 and promoted the standard recently articulated in Rock v.
not bar review in this Court." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375, 383-384 (1955)). Justice Brennan noted that Illinois appellate courts do
possess this power under Illinois Sup. Ct. Rule 615(a), which provides: "[p]lain errors
affecting substantial rights may be noticed [on appeal] even though they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 615(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1985). As a result, the United States Supreme Court is free to address the
merits of the case. Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the Supreme Court had
stated that" '[the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of
giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he
had no right to use.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 23 (1967)). Furthermore, the" 'right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense.'"
Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 23).
92 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
94 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted three such restrictions: irrele-
vant evidence; testimony by "persons who are mentally infirm;" and evidence that "rep-
resents a half-truth." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan relied on Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683, 690 (1986)(the exclusion of evidence bearing on the credibility of a voluntary
1988] 845
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Arkansas9 6 that restrictions on the right to present evidence can be
constitutional only if they " 'accomodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process' and are not 'arbitrary or disproportion-
ate to the purposes they are designed to serve.' -97
Justice Brennan then reviewed the present case using the stan-
dard announced in Rock, framing the issue as "whether precluding a
criminal defense witness from testifying bears an arbitrary and dis-
proportionate relation to the purposes of discovery." 98
Justice Brennan began this part of his analysis by noting that
discovery helps to "develop a full account of the relevant facts,
helps detect and expose attempts to falsify evidence, and prevents
factors such as surprise" from deciding the ultimate outcome of a
case.99 Justice Brennan maintained that these goals are met by com-
pliance with the rules, not exclusion of evidence. 0 0 Therefore, dis-
covery sanctions should serve to meet these same goals by
"correcting for the adverse effects of discovery violations and deter-
ring future discovery violations from occuring."' 0' As a result, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that sanctions which meet these goals and do
not purposely distort the fact-finding process, as preclusion does,
should be used.
10 2
Justice Brennan examined the objectives of the preclusion sanc-
tion first as a corrective, as opposed to a punitive, sanction. Under
this classification, preclusion "is asserted to have two justifications:
(1) it bars the defendant from introducing testimony that has not
been tested by discovery, and (2) it screens out witnesses who are
inherently suspect because they were not disclosed until trial." 103
Justice Brennan argued that the first justification was not appli-
cable because Taylor did not question the right to have Wormley's
testimony first heard out of the presence of the jurors, or to have a
confession held unconstitutional); Chambers v. Mississipi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973)("an
application of the hearsay rule to statements that 'were originally made and susequently
offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their relia-
bility' " also held unconstitutional); and Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 ("rules that prevent
whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories
that presume them unworthy of belief" are unconstitutional). Id. at 660 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
96 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709 (1987)("a per se rule excluding all post-hypnosis testimony"
held unconstitutional).
97 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at
295).
98 Id. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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continuation to allow the prosecution time for further discovery
concerning Wormley's testimony.' 0 4 Thus, he asserted that both
United States v. Nobles' 0 5 and Brown v. United States,' 06 which the ma-
jority relied upoil, are not on point.'
0 7
Justice Brennan maintained that because the preclusion in
Nobles was not permanent it was not pertinent to Taylor, for the "au-
thority of trial courts to prevent the presentation of a 'half-truth' by
ordering further discovery is not at issue here," as it was in Nobles.'08
Justice Brennan stated that Brown was also inappropriate for the
same reasons. 10 9
Justice Brennan found the exclusion of inherently suspect wit-
nesses equally inappropriate." 10 Justice Brennan noted that the trial
court did not even rely on this in precluding the testimony, but in-
stead included it after the ruling had already been made,1 1' and
gave no indication that this ground alone would have been sufficient
to exclude the testimony.
112
Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued that precluding evidence
because of its apparent lack of credibility was not available under
Illinois law," 13 under which judges are not even allowed to comment
on the credibility of witnesses."14 Justice Brennan also noted that
no cases that interpreted Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(g) 1 5 sug-
104 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
106 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
107 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 662 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "[for similar reasons, the
holding in Brown ... can have no bearing on this case." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I 10 Id. at 662 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I1l I d. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the trial judge stated:
"Further,for whatever value it is, because this is ajury trial, I have a great deal of doubt in my
mind as to the veracity of this young man ...." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added by Justice Brennan).
112 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing People v. Van Dyke, 414 Ill. 251, 254, 111
N.E.2d 165, 167, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 978, (1953)(the credibility of the witnesses
presented to be left to thejury, not the judge); Village of Des Plaines v. Winkelman, 270
Ill. 149, 159, 110 N.E. 417, 422 (1915)(jury to determine the weight given to each
witness)).
114 Id. at 662 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93, 98,
180 N.E.2d 491,493 (1962) (decisions of fact left to the jury so it is not within the prov-
ince of the judge to convey his or her opinions to the jury); People v. Heidorn, 114 Ill.
App. 3d 933, 936,449 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1983)(ajudge is not allowed to comment on the
credibility of a witness by word or conduct)).
115 Illinois S. Ct. Rule 415(g) states:
Sanctions (i) If at any time during the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an
order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discov-
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gested "that the rule gives a trial judge special authority to exclude
criminal defense witnesses based on their apparent or presumed
unreliability."116 .
Justice Brennan also stated that precluding evidence "based on
its presumptive or apparent lack of credibility would be antithetical
to the principles laid down" ' 1 7 in Washington, in which the Court
asserted that the testimony of witnesses was beneficial to the truth
finding process and expressed the opinion that the jury should be
left to determine the veracity and weight of such testimony.'",
Justice Brennan pointed out that the Washington Court "con-
cluded that 'arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that pre-
sume them unworthy of belief' are unconstitutional."' 19 Therefore,
in discussing the class of witnesses not identified by defense until
trial, "any presumption that they are so suspect that the jury can be
prevented from even listening to their testimony is at least as arbi-
trary as presumptions excluding an accomplice's testimony, hearsay
statements bearing indicia of reliability, or a defendant's post-hyp-
nosis testimony-all of which have been declared unconstitu-
tional."' 120 Justice Brennan argued that the proper method to use
with such witnesses under the Washington doctrine and Illinois law is
to let the jury hear the testimony and then allow "the prosecutor to
inform the jury about the circumstances casting doubt on the
testimony."12'
Justice Brennan then addressed the punitive objectives and the
deterrence of future discovery violations, which the sanction is also
intended to accomplish. 122 Instead of preclusion, Justice Brennan
argued that direct sanctions such as contempt or disciplinary pro-
ery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, ex-
clude such evidence, or enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances. (ii) Willful violation by counsel of an applicable discovery rule or an
order issued pursuant thereto may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the
court.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I1 A, para. 415(g) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
116 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 662-663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the Court there held that:
[T]he truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of
competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in
a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury
.... [W]e believe that [the latter] reasoning [is] required by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
119 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at
22).
120 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
121 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ceedings can be made more proportionate to the severity of the dis-
covery rule violation. 123 In contrast, he said, preclusion can be
quite disproportionate 24 and arbitrary. 25 Justice Brennan noted
that this is particularly true when the defendant is penalized through
the exclusion even though he was not personally responsible for the
violation. 1
26
Justice Brennan acknowledged that while it was clear that Tay-
lor's attorney had willfully violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule
413(d),127 there was no evidence that the defendant had partici-
pated in that violation in any way and no investigation into that mat-
ter was conducted. 28 Instead, Justice Brennan got the "impression
that the main reason the trial court excluded Wormley's testimony
was the belief that the defense counsel had purposefully lied about
when he had located Wormley."' 29
Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that the trial court ex-
cluded the testimony at least partially in response to discovery viola-
tions by different defense attorneys in different cases.' 30 The
Court's response that this would not normally provide proper
grounds for exclusion without further application of the analysis to
this case was not, injustice Brennan's view, an adequate response to
this problem.13 1
Justice Brennan proposed that when there exists no evidence of
the defendant's involvement in an attorney's willful violation, then a
direct sanction against the attorney is "not only fairer but more effec-
tive in deterring violations than [would be] excluding defense evi-
dence."' 1 2  Instead, personal sanctions such as "disciplinary
proceedings, fines, or imprisonment will likely influence attorney
behavior to a far greater extent than the rather indirect penalty
123 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 Id: (Brennan,J., dissenting). Preclusion could "result in a defendant charged with
a capital offense being convicted and receiving a death sentence he would not have re-
ceived but for the discovery violation." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Preclusion "might, in another case involving an iden-
tical discovery violation, result in a defendant suffering no change in verdict or, if
charged with a lesser offense, being convicted and receiving a light or a suspended sen-
tence." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Illinois S. Ct. Rule 413(d) states: "defense counsel
... shall furnish the state with the following material and information within his posses-
sion or control: (i) The names and last known addresses of persons he intends to call as
witnesses .... ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 413(d)(i) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
128 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 664-665 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 665 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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threatened by evidentiary exclusion." 133
Justice Brennan also made a distinction between tactical errors
an attorney makes during the course of a trial and attorney miscon-
duct.13 4 In doing so, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's determi-
nation that because a client is not permitted the power to question
all tactical decisions, so too the client cannot question the attorney's
decisions regarding violations of discovery rules.13 5 Justice Bren-
nan defined tactical errors to be those that result from a legitimate
choice between different options that, in hindsight, turn out to have
been mistakes.13 6 Justice Brennan admitted that penalizing attor-
neys for such mistakes would be impractical and futile 3 7 and that
with these types of errors the defendant necessarily must be
penalized.' 3
8
In contrast, Justice Brennan maintained that attorney miscon-
duct is never the result of a choice between legitimate options and is
visible without the aid of hindsight.13 9 Because direct punitive sanc-
tions are available against the attorney in such situations, these
should be applied exclusively unless the defendant somehow will-
fully participated in the rule violation. 140
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the Court's decision cre-
ated a conflict of interest in that the attorney's best argument
against preclusion of the witness in cases of willful misconduct is to
argue for personal sanctions against himself.14' Given such a stan-
dard, it is impossible to "expect defense counsel in this or any other
case to act as vigorous advocates for the interests of their clients
when those interests are adverse to their own." 142
In conclusion, Justice Brennan stated that the Court, in uphold-
ing the discovery rules that are meant to assist the criminal system in
ascertaining the truth, in fact subverted that ultimate goal of the
criminal system by allowing convictions based on an incomplete
representation of the facts. 143
l33 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 666 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissCIAing opinion, making it
clear that he joined Justice Brennan's dissent only as confined to
"general reciprocal-discovery rules"'144 and not "for any position as
to permissible sanctions for noncompliance with rules designed for
specific kinds of evidence as, for example, a notice-of-alibi rule."' 45
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In Taylor v. Illinois the Court first held that the compulsory pro-
cess clause of the sixth amendment and not the due process clause
of the fifth amendment provided the constitutional basis for a de-
fendant's right to present testimony in his favor. That distinction
determines the proper test to be used in establishing when the infr-
ingment of the right to present testimony is a violation of a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 146 A balanc-
ing test of the competing interests involved is used for questions
concerning the sixth amendment, whereas a more general fairness
standard is used for fifth amendment due process concerns.
147
While the Court in Taylor acknowledged the appropriateness of
the use of a balancing of interests test, it did not clearly establish or
utilize such a test in its determination of whether the preclusion of
the defense witness in Taylor was a contitutional violation. Instead,
the Court based its decision in Taylor on a willful violation standard
that appeared to operate as an exception to the balancing of inter-
ests test. 148 The Court's lack of adherance to the analytical frame-
work provided by precedent is unsound and, more importantly, may
lead to future violations of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to present a defense.
This Note suggests that a more clearly defined balancing test
should be. applied in determining when the preclusion of a defend-
ant's witness as a discovery sanction violates his sixth amendment
compulsory process clause rights.
A. COMPULSORY PROCESS VERSUS DUE PROCESS
The holding in Taylor that the compulsory process clause pro-
vided the constitutional basis for a criminal defendant's right to
present a defense resolved a previously open question. Prior to Tay-
144 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 667-668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 See infra notes 171-180 and accompanying text for discussion of the balancing test.
147 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
148 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655.
1988]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
lor, it was unclear whether the right to present a defense rested
solely on the sixth amendment's compulsory process clause or the
fifth amendment's due process clause.
Before Taylor, the Supreme Court had decided a number of
cases that dealt with the right to present a defense and had deter-
mined that a defendant clearly has a constitutionally protected right
to present a defense.' 49 However, those cases did not clearly estab-
lish whether that right was based on the compulsory process
clause 150 or due process.' 51
In Washington v. Texas, 152 the Court held a Texas statute uncon-
stitutional because it arbitrarily prohibited the defendant from offer-
ing the testimony of an accomplice.153 In so ruling, the Court based
its decision on the compulsory process clause, noting that it would
be meaningless if the defendant had the right to compel the attend-
ance of witnesses but was powerless to have those witnesses tes-
tify. 154 Although that decision appeared to have resolved the role of
the compulsory process clause in the right to defend, 155 the
Supreme Court backpeddled in Brooks v. Tennessee.156
In Brooks, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a rule that
149 For a survey of the pre-Taylor cases regarding the right. to present a defense, see
generally, Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee In Crimi-
nal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 756-792 (1976)(Cases clearly establish that a criminal de-
fendant has a constitutionally protected right to present a defense that controls even
partial exclusion of defense testimony. The constitutional basis for this right, however,
was unclear.); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 127-131
(1974)(Cases had based the right to defend on both the the compulsory process clause
and due process. While it was not irrational to do so on due process grounds, the more
specific compulsory process clause is preferable.).
150 Cases basing the right to present a defense on compulsory process include: Rock
v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972); Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
151 Cases basing the right to present a defense on due process include: Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948). In addition, the Supreme Court has also grounded the right to present
a defense in the privilege against self-incrimination (Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605
(1972)), the right to counsel (Brooks, 406 U.S. 605; Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
(1961); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949)), and the right to confront witnesses (Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
152 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (arbitrary exclusion of accomplice's testimony held unconstitu-
tional because it violated defendant's sixth amendment right to compel the attendance
of witnesses and offer testimony).
153 Id. at 23.
154 Id. at 19, 23 ("The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testi-
mony he had no right to use.").
155 See Westen, supra note 149, at 117.
156 406 U.S. 605 (1972). See also United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.
1974) (defendant's compulsory process rights limited to the physical presence of the wit-
ness in the courtroom).
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required defendants to testify in their own defense at the beginning
of their case or be precluded from doing so later.157 The parties
failed to raise the issue of compulsory process or the Washington de-
cision, and the Court based its decision on the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. 158 The dis-
sent in Brooks demonstrated the shortcomings of both of these
arguments. 159
One commentator has noted that even though the Court was
"still vacillating between compulsory process and due process as a
ground for its decisions, the Court [had] said and done enough to
support the conclusion that it recognize[ed] a comprehensive right
of the accused to present a defense through witnesses."' 160 In so
doing, the Court referred to compulsory process in dictum 161 or in
reversing convictions 162 "by reference to Washington163 and on
grounds consistent with a broad view of compulsory process."'164
The importance of basing the defendant's right to present a de-
fense on the sixth amendment rests in the different tests that have
developed for protecting sixth amendment rights as opposed to fifth
157 Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612.
158 Id. at 612-613.
159 Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court ruled that the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination was violated because the statute penalized him for re-
maining silent at the beginning of his case. The dissent noted that the defendant never
took the stand, so it was difficult to understand how his right to remain silent was in-
fringed upon. Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court also held that the statute
violated the defendant's right to counsel because it interfered with his lawyer's "tactical
decision" regarding when he should be called to testify. Id. at 612. The dissent noted
that counsel was not really prevented from doing anything for his client, but that the
defendant's ability to present his own defense was infringed upon. Id. at 618 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
160 Westen, supra note 149, at 120.
161 United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969). The Supreme Court ruled
that, had the government failed to produce certain evidence during Augenblick's court
martial, it could have amounted to a denial of compulsory process rights. It was not
clear from the record, however, whether this had actually occurred, so the Court ruled
that no constitutional question was presented.
162 See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)(exclusion of defendant's alibi
evidence due to his failure to meet the requirements of a notice-of-alibi statute
amounted to denial of compulsory process rights); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973)(exclusion of testimony under the hearsay rule that was critical to Chambers'
defense found to be an unconstitutional infringement upon his right to present a de-
fense); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972)(overturning lower court holding that
allowed the jury to ignore testimony for the defense unless it believed the testimony to
be true beyond a reasonable doubt as inconsistent with compulsory process rights as
established in Washington); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972)(trial judge's intimidation
of a defense witness that kept the witness from testifying held to be unconstitutional
infringement of defendant's right to offer testimony as expressed in Washington).
165 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
164 Westen, supra note 149, at 120.
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amendment due process rights. Sixth amendment rights, being spe-
cifically guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, are analyzed under a
balancing of interests test whereas due process concerns are re-
solved by general fairness standards.
As Justice Brennan discussed in his dissent, the Supreme Court
in Rock v. Arkansas 165 determined, in effect, that a balancing of inter-
ests analysis is required in order to uphold an infringement of a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. 166 The Court in Rock
held that courts "must evaluate whether the interests served by a
rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional
right to testify."' 1 6 7 In addition, a balancing test was implicit in the
Washington decision, in which the Court determined that the state's
interest in preventing perjury did not warrant infringing upon the
defendant's constitutional right to present testimony because there
existed an alternative that adequately protected the state's interest
and did not infringe upon the defendant's rights.
1 68
The Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien 169 held that a bal-
ancing test relies on the recognition that constitutional rights are
not absolute and there may exist justifications for infringing upon
those rights. 170 The balancing test, when properly defined, deter-
mines when such infringements are justified.
The interests that should be balanced in evaluating the defend-
ant's right to present a defense were not clearly defined in Taylor,
nor had the Court previously established them due to its vacillations
between compulsory process and due process as the basis for the
right to present a defense. The Supreme Court's previous cases in-
dicate, however, that the relevant interests to be balanced include,
on one side, the fundamental nature of the constitutional guarantee
to present a defense, 17 1 and the importance of the offered testimony
165 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
166 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 660-661 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Rock, 107 S. Ct. at
2711).
167 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
168 See Westen, supra note 149, at 115-117, 128-129 (commenting on Washington, 388
U.S. 14). Professor Westen viewed Washington as based upon a balancing test and com-
mented that the balancing test required by the compulsory process clause "more clearly
identifies not only the particular interests being weighed, but the appropriate (compel-
ling interest') standard for weighing them." Id. at 129. See also Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (Court stated that a denial of a sixth amendment right "calls
into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the com-
peting interest be closely examined.")(citation omitted).
169 391 U.S. 367 (1968)(upholding the infringement of a defendant's first amendment
rights due to a compelling state interest in the preservation of draft cards).
170 Id. at 376-377.
171 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
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to the defendant's ability to present a defense.17 2 On the other side,
the Court should weigh the importance of the state's interest in or-
derly, fair, and accurate criminal trials' 73 as protected by the rules of
discovery. 174
This structure without further definition does not, however,
provide the appropriate weight courts should give to these various
interests. An appropriate way to measure the extent of the govern-
ment's interests in a balancing of interests analysis is by looking to
see if there is a compelling state interest. 175 If the state interest is
not found to be compelling, then it will never outweigh the defend-
ant's constitutional right. 176 If it is found to be compelling,' 77 then
infringement of fundamental constitutional rights could be allowed
if infringement is essential to protecting the compelling state inter-
est.178 Even if the state interest is compelling, the Court should still
determine whether alternative means exist that adequately protect
the state's interest but which infringe less upon the defendant's con-
stitutional right. 79 These alternative means do not have to protect
the state interest equally well, just so long as they do so "ade-
quately."' 8 0 If such alternatives adequately protect the state inter-
est, then the balance shifts back to protecting the defendant's
constitutional right and the infringement should not be allowed. As
a result, the infringement should be allowed only if it protects a
172 See id. at 302 (Court was influenced by the fact that the excluded evidence was
"critical to Chambers' defense"); Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (Court was influenced by
the fact that the excluded evidence was "vital to the defense").
173 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)(sixth amendment "does not
confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial
system").
174 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("The accused, as is required of the State, must comply
with established rules of procedure and evidence ....").
175 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)(a compelling state interest
required to infringe constitutionally guaranteed rights concerning social security laws).
See also Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a De-
fense, 82 YALE L.J. 1342, 1353-1361 (1972)(general discussion of the applicability of the
compelling state interest analysis to the compulsory process clause).
176 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)(voting requirements that denied some
citizens the right to vote held unconstitutional because they were not necessary to fur-
ther any compelling state interest).
177 The Court has defined a "compelling interest" as one that is important or substan-
tial. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.' 367, 377 (1968).
178 See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-377.
179 See Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254
(1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
180 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964)(A federal act limiting
members of Communist parties from travelling violated their right to liberty because
"national security can be adequately protected by means which, when compared with
[ihe act], are more discriminately tailored to the constitutional liberties of individuals.").
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compelling state interest and no effective, less infringing alternative
exists.
In contrast, due process rights are protected by a general fair-
ness approach, sometimes called a totality of the circumstances test,
that looks to the facts and circumstances of each case.' 81 That less
defined standard, therefore, necessarily limits those decisions to
particular factual situations, thereby eliminating potentially useful
guidelines and reducing a case's precedential value.1812
Justice Stevens' declaration in Taylor that "[t]he right to offer
testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment"'1 3 should fur-
ther aid in resolving the existing confusion over the constitutional
basis for the right to offer testimony and present an argument in
favor of the compulsory process clause over due process. That dec-
laration would be more encouraging if not for the Court's lack of
adherance in Taylor to the balancing of interests analysis that it had
previously enunciated.
In deciding Taylor, Justice Stevens outlined, but failed to define
and apply, a substantive sixth amendment balancing of interests
analysis. In fact, the balancing testJustice Stevens' purported to use
was so loosely defined that it is barely distinguishable from the total-
ity of the circumstances test that has been held appropriate for fifth
amendment due process rights.18 4 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
based the Court's decision in Taylor on a novel willful violation stan-
dard that appears to operate independently of any balancing test
and would allow for automatic preclusion when its requirements are
met. 185
181 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). In ruling on a
prosecutorial comment, the Court stated:
When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken
special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes
them. But here the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark.., so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.
Id. See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565 (1967)(In affirming defendants' felony
convictions despite evidence that informed jury of defendants' prior convictions, Court
held that "no specific federal right... is involved; reliance is placed solely on a general
'fairness' approach.").
182 See, e.g., United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 238 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 923 (1974)(discussing lack of precedent set by Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973), a case decided on the general fairness standards of due process).
183 Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).
184 See supra note 181.
185 See infra notes 196-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of the willful viola-
tion standard.
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B. TAYLOR'S FLAWED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
1. The Court's Balancing Test
Justice Stevens in Taylor appeared to indicate his adoption of a
balancing test to be applied in determining the constitutional use of
preclusion as a discovery sanction.18 6 Justice Stevens further ap-
peared to have laid a strong analytical framework for establishing a
balancing test when he declared that a "trial court may not ignore
the fundamental character" 187 of a defendant's compulsory process
clause right to present testimony, but at the same time such right
could not "automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing
public interests."' 88 The Court listed three public interests to be
protected: "the integrity of the adversary process;". "the interest in
the fair and efficient administration ofjustice; and the potential prej-
udice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." 18 9
The Court asserted that all three factors must "weigh in the bal-
ance."190 In addition, Justice Stevens also concluded, consistent
with the Court's prior balancing of interests analysis, 19 1 that there
186 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655. In concluding that the compulsory process clause does
not create an absolute bar to the use of preclusion as a discovery sanction, the Court
resolved another previously unanswered question. Compare United States v. Davis, 639
F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1981)(preclusion an impermissible infringement on a defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense) with Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction,
604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1979)(right to present a defense not absolute, but the State's
interest in restricting that right closely scrutinized); United States ex rel. Enoch v. Harti-
gan, 768 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1985)(adopting balancing
test to determine whether preclusion permissible). The Seventh Circuit had also ruled
that the defendant cannot be precluded from testifying due to a discovery violation.
Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 925 (1982). The Ninth Circuit did not endorse either a
balancing test or a per se prohibition of preclusion. Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d
1181 (9th Cir. 1984)(The court did not choose between the two alternatives because it
found that "under either of these approaches, the Arizona courts erred in excluding the
testimony of an important defense witness."). The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of preclusion based on a state statute. Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.
1966). Several circuit courts had allowed preclusion but did not address the sanction's
constitutional aspects. United States v. White, 583 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Fitts, 576 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 524 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Two district courts
had rejected the adoption of a per se rule. Escalera v. Coombe, 652 F. Supp. 1316
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511 (D.NJ. 1986), appeal pending, No.
86-5204 (3d Cir.). Prior to Taylor, the Supreme Court had twice expressly reserved its
judgment on the constitutionality of precluding a criminal defendant's witness as a sanc-
tion for violating discovery rules. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 nA (1973);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970).




191 See supra notes 169-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate
balancing test.
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was a compelling state interest involved in Taylor, namely the or-
derly conduct of a criminal trial, which involves the imposition of
rules of evidence. 192
As Justice Brennan's dissent noted, however, the Court failed to
finish this analysis in that it never engaged in an in-depth analysis of
available alternative sanctions. 193 The Taylor Court's decision was
flawed in that it failed to adequately consider the alternatives avail-
able to preclusion and their effectiveness in protecting the acknowl-
edged state interest, 194 as previously required for infringing upon a
specific Bill of Rights constitutional guarantee, 195 such as the sixth
amendment's right to present a defense. Without such an analysis,
it was impossible for the Court to properly weigh the necessary pro-
tection required by the compelling state interest in orderly trials
against the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. In
effect, the interests that Justice Stevens himself had noted earlier in
the Taylor opinion were never really balanced.
2. The Court's Willful Standard Test
Despite Justice Stevens' enunciation of a balancing test in Tay-
lor, he actually appeared to disregard the balancing test when he
announced a standard that allows for the preclusion of a defense
witness as a sanction for a willful discovery violation.' 96 Justice Ste-
vens' disregard of his own balancing test became clear when he de-
termined that a willful violation of a discovery rule intended to
either gain a tactical advantage' 97 or to conceal fabricated testi-
192 108 S. Ct. at 653 ("The State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is
sufficient to justify the imposition and enforcement of ... rules ... of evidence.").
193 Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's consideration of alternative sanc-
tions follows:
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate in most
cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less effective than the preclusion
sanction and that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than
limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process.
Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655. However, given the Court's holding that the exclusion of pre-
sumably fabricated testimony is a goal of discovery, the Court's abrupt analysis of the
alternatives is more understandable. If excluding presumably perjured testimony is a
primary goal of discovery rules, then alternative sanctions are clearly inadequate be-
cause they allow the testimony to be admitted and so could influence the jury. In that
respect, no alternative sanction could effectively protect this compelling state interest
and the Court would appear justified in ruling that preclusion does not constitutionally
violate a defendant's compulsory process clause right to present a defense.
194 See infra notes 233-243 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternative
sanctions.
195 See supra notes 169-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate
balancing test.
196 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655-657.
197 Id. at 655-656. Justice Stevens noted that when a violation "was willful and moti-
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monyt98 would allow preclusion of the testimony regardless of the
alternative sanctions 99 available or any actual prejudice that would
be done to the state if the testimony was admitted.
200
While the balancing test established in Taylor is, at best, only
inadequately defined, this willful violation standard appears funda-
mentally inconsistent with the Court's holding in Washington v.
Texas.20 This inconsistency can be attributed to the emphasis Jus-
tice Stevens' placed on evidentiary goals in his opinion in Taylor.
20 2
There are two commonly held justifications for the preclusion
of a witness's testimony: the evidentiary justification and the puni-
tive justification.203 The punitive justification relies on the belief
that preclusion is the only effective sanction for enforcing a state's
discovery rules given the circumstances of a particular case.204 Be-
cause that conflict will be decided within the balancing of interests
analysis, the punitive justification resolves itself into the balancing
test discussed previously because it involves determining the impor-
tance of the state's interest in enforcing the discovery rule, the im-
portance of admitting the particular testimony at issue to the
defendant's case, and the effectiveness of alternative sanctions. 20 5
Alternatively, the evidentiary justification is based on the concept
that preclusion should be used to disqualify incompetent evi-
dence.20 6 This view found support from the Supreme Court in
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.20 7 In Hammond, the Court upheld
vated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage ... it would be entirely consistent with
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply to exclude the witness' testimony."
198 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655. Where "a pattern of discovery violations is explicable
only on the assumption that the violations were designed to conceal a plan to present
fabricated testimony, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence."
Id.
199 Id. Justice Stevens held that when the discovery violations revealed the purpose of
gaining a tactical advantage or concealing fabricated testimony, it "would be entirely
appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence regardless of whether other sanctions would
also be merited." Id.
200 Id. at 656. Justice Stevens stated that, "[riegardless of whether prejudice to the
prosecution could have been avoided in this particular case, it is plain that the case fits
into the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is appropriate."
Id.
201 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
202 108 S. Ct. at 655-657.
203 See Note, supra note 175, at 1343-1344.
204 See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 255, 241 (1975). The exclusion of a
defendant's witness due to a discovery rule violation was justified in order to uphold the
state's interest in presenting the whole truth to the jury.
205 See supra notes 169-180 and accompanying text.
206 See Note, supra note 175, at 1344.
207 212 U.S. 322 (1909). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 37 (West 1968) advisory committee and
historical notes, which regarded this case as support for the preclusion sanction in Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that imposed preclusion
of evidence on the defendant for willfully refusing to comply with an
order that required him to produce evidence. 208 In deciding this
case on due process grounds, the Court held that the willful refusal
gave rise to a presumption of "bad faith and untruth" 20 9 and that
the failure "was but an admission of the want of merit in the as-
serted defense." 210 Hammond suggests that a violation of discovery
rules makes otherwise admissible evidence "presumptively unwor-
thy of belief and the resulting incompetency of the evidence justifies
its inadmissibility."-2
1'
This doctrine was overturned, however, in Washington, when the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional on compulsory process
grounds a Texas statute that prohibited accomplices from testifying
based on the presumption that each would lie for the other.212 The
Court ruled that this statute violated the compulsory process clause
because it contained "arbitrary rules that prevent[ed] whole catego-
ries of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori cate-
gories that presume them unworthy of belief."
213
As a result, the exclusion of witnesses due to an a priori classifi-
cation that presumes their testimony to be untrustworthy was held
unconstitutional. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Taylor,
that ruling should be applicable to the Taylor analysis.
214
In Taylor, it seems clear that Justice Stevens relied primarily on
an evidentiary justification for allowing preclusion as a discovery
sanction. 21 5 Justice Stevens noted that discovery "minimizes the
risk that a judgement will be predicated on . . . deliberately
208 Hammond, 212 U.S. at 354.
209 Id. at 350.
210 Id. Accord State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968)(fail-
ure to meet notice-of-alibi statute requirements brought into question the truth of de-
fendant's testimony and warranted preclusion of his testimony).
211 See Note, supra note 175, at 1345.
212 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
213 Id. at 22.
214 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 663 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the
holding in Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (pertaining to a statute that disqualified witnesses
for interest incompetency), was not limited to incompetency issues. He based this read-
ing of Washington on the Court's analysis in Washington and Rosen v. United States, 245
U.S. 467 (1918)(Court held unconstitutional a common law disqualification based on
moral incapacity) that disqualifying a witness for any reason was a sixth amendment
concern. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 653-656. Prior to Taylor, discovery rules were understood to promote two
underlying state interests. See Note, supra note 175, at 1354-1355. The first was to pre-
vent surprise at trial. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970); State ex rel. Simos v.
Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 133, 163 N.W.2d 177, 182 (1968). This presumably furthers the
truth-seeking function of the trial system. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81
(1970). The second was to reduce the trial load of the court system by eliminating the
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fabricated testimony," 21 6 and that "[olne of the purposes of the dis-
covery rule itself is to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony
will be believed. ' 21 7 Justice Stevens went on to compare evidence
found after the conclusion of trial to witnesses introduced once the
trial had begun. He stated that just as there exists the presumption
that evidence found after trial would not have affected the outcome,
it is "equally reasonable to presume that there is something suspect
about a defense witness who is not identified until after" trial has
started.21 8
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that if a pattern of discovery
rule violations "is explicable only on the assumption that the viola-
tions were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testi-
mony, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted
evidence." 219 In concluding that preclusion did not violate the com-
pulsory process clause per se, Justice Stevens wrote that it "would
demean the high purpose of the Compulsory Process Clause to con-
strue it as encompassing an absolute right to an automatic continu-
ance or mistrial to allow presumptively perjured testimony to be
presented to a jury."220
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, Justice Stevens state-
ments are clearly inconsistent with the holding in Washington in that
they support arbitrarily precluding, a priori, a category of wit-
nesses. 221 In this case the preclusion rule keeps witnesses not iden-
tified until the commencement of trial from testifying on the
arbitrary presumption that they are untrustworthy.
C. A MODIFIED BALANCING TEST
A more detailed balancing of interests analysis has been sug-
gested that, although the Court declined to adopt in Taylor, none-
theless would provide a more practical guideline for determining
the validity of constitutional infringements upon the compulsory
process clause through the use of the preclusion sanction. 222 In
need for trial in many cases. Id. (Court contended that liberal discovery would lead to
more frequent dismissals and more plea bargains).
216 Id. at 654.
217 Id. at 655.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 656.
221 Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222 Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1984)(precluding the testi-
mony of two defense witnesses due to defendant's failure to provide the addresses of the




Fendler v. Goldsmith, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined a bal-
ancing test that required a court to consider alternative sanctions,
the importance of the offered testimony to the defendant's case, the
actual prejudice against the state caused by the offered testimony,
and whether the discovery violation was willful.223
Similar modified balancing tests had been adopted and applied
in several federal courts prior to Taylor.224 Such a modified balanc-
ing test starts with a presumption against the exclusion of what
would otherwise be admissible evidence due to the fundamental im-
portance attributed to the defendant's compulsory process clause
rights. 225 Next, the Court should examine the effectiveness of
other, less restrictive sanctions, the actual surprise or prejudice
done to the prosecution, the materiality of the offered testimony to
the defendant's case, and any evidence of bad faith in the discovery
rule violation. 2
26
Subsequent to undertaking this balancing test, a court could
more effectively determine the appropriate sanction given the sever-
ity of the discovery violation. There exist a range of sanctions that
can be tailored to more appropriately fit the extent and severity of
the discovery violations that do not infringe upon the defendant's
compulsory process clause rights to the extent that preclusion does.
In evaluating these sanctions, the ability to protect the state's inter-
est,2 2 7 the degree of infringement on the defendant's compulsory
process rights, 228 the potential to deter future violations, 229 and the
cost to the state230 should be factors considered in determining the
effectiveness of each sanction.
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, disciplinary sanctions
against defense counsel should prove effective when counsel will-
fully violates discovery rules.23' These sanctions could include dis-
ciplinary proceedings, fines, or imprisonment.2 32 The deterrent
potential against future violations should be great because the law-
yer generally stands to gain little from the violation while exposing
himself to all the potential disciplinary actions.
223 Id.
224 See supra note 186. See also Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1187 (listing of such cases).
225 Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188.
226 See id.; Enoch v. Hartigan, 768 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1985).
227 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
229 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 175, at
1356-1357 for a discussion of alternative sanctions and their deterrent effect.
230 See Note, supra note 175, at 1357.
231 Id. at 665 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A continuance could also protect the state's interest equally
well as preclusion (if that interest is defined to be eliminating sur-
prise at trial and not the exclusion of fabricated testimony), by al-
lowing the prosecution time to prepare a rebuttal to any new
evidence. However, it has been suggested that a continuance is not
really a sanction at all in that it does not penalize the defendant for
the violation and thus has little deterrent effect. 23 3 In addition, the
cost of a continuance to the state could be substantial.
23 4
Allowing either judicial or prosecutorial comment concerning
the testimony in question would serve to eliminate some of the ad-
vantage of surprise that the defendant may have gained by the dis-
covery violation, 23 5 and its impact on the jury would serve as a
powerful deterrent in cases of willful violations. 236 This sanction
also imposes no cost on the state. However, constitutional ques-
tions are raised over the legitimate use of comment, which may in-
fringe upon a defendant's due process rights.
23 7
Criminal sanctions against the defendant for willfull violations
have questionable effectiveness. A defendant facing a long prison
term may disregard the possibility of a short prison term being ad-
ded to, his sentence. 238 The lesser the length of the possible prison
term, however, the greater the impact of an additional short prison
term. An additional problem exists in that a second trial to deter-
mine the defendant's guilt would prove costly to the state.
Limiting further discovery by the defendant is based on a recip-
rocal approach to discovery rules.23 9 Once the defendant has vio-
lated discovery procedures he could no longer enjoy the benefits of
future discovery. 240 Although this sanction seems fair, it has consti-
tutional problems itself.241 Because discovery is also protected by
the compulsory process clause, this sanction would infringe upon
that right just as preclusion does.242 It would also be counter-
233 See Note, supra note 175, at 1357. See also Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 29, 35-36 (1964).
234 See Rezneck, New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. LJ. 1276, 1293 (1966).
235 See Note, supra note 175, at 1358.
236 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)(the impact of improper
prosecutorial comment was so substantial that the defendant's conviction was reversed).
237 See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933)(there must exist a rational
connection between the likely degree of veracity of the evidence and some characteristic
of that evidence on which to base the comment in order to comply with due process).
238 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655.
239 See Note, Criminal Law: Constitutionality of Conditional Mutual Discovey Under Federal
Rule 16, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 419, 424 (1966).
240 See Note, supra note 175, at 1358.
241 Id.
242 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
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productive to the state's interest in liberal discovery.243 Addition-
ally, this sanction is ineffective if the discovery violation is not
discovered until trial, as in Taylor.
In Taylor, with the exception of the bad faith element, none of
the above enumerated interests were given any consideration, nor
even deemed relevant under the willful violation standard utilized.
The willful violation standard in Taylor focused exclusively on the
bad faith element suggesting that, in the future, the most significant
factor in determining sanctions for discovery violations will be
whether there has been a blatant disregard of the rules of the adver-
sary system, regardless of the actual damage done. Furthermore, as
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the Taylor court did not con-
sider the materiality of Wormley's testimony to Taylor's defense. In
this case, Wormley's testimony would have been the only testimony
for Taylor that "would have both placed a gun in Bridges' brother
(sic) hands and contradicted the testimony of Bridges and his
brother that they possessed no weapons that evening." 244 Overall,
the modified balancing test endorsed in this Note would provide a
better safeguard of a defendant's still emerging compulsory process
clause right to present a defense than Taylor's willful violation stan-
dard. The greatest danger in the willful violation standard estab-
lished in Taylor is the possibility that an innocent defendant may be
convicted of a crime that he did not commit due to his attorney's
violation of an independent discovery rule and the resulting preclu-
sion of a material witness. 245 That potentiality certainly seems to
conflict with "a fundamental value determination of our society that




In Taylor v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the preclusion of a criminal defendant's witness as a discovery sanc-
tion does not per se violate that defendant's right to present a de-
fense. The majority persuasively reasoned that the sixth
amendment's compulsory process clause is the constitutional basis
for this right. However, the Court failed to apply the appropriate
balancing test for determining sixth amendment questions in reach-
243 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970). The Court in Williams stated that
liberal discovery allows the state and the defendant "ample opportunity to investigate
certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence." Id. at 82.
244 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245 See Note, supra note 175, at 1361.
246 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring).
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ing its holding on the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction.
The "willful violation" standard that the Court used instead will fail
to adequately protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to pres-
ent a defense because it allows for the arbitrary exclusion of defense
witnesses without requiring a balancing of the relevant interests
involved.
JOHN STOCKER
